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I. ORIGINALISM
Originalism—the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted
according to its original meaning—has engendered intense debate in
modern times. There are those who believe that originalism is the only
true method by which to interpret the Constitution, and those who
believe that it is a spurious philosophy that distorts constitutional
interpretation. In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia
v. Heller,1 marking the first time that a majority of the Court agreed to
an opinion decidedly originalist in its methodology.2 Although Heller
may be considered the “Triumph of Originalism,”3 it may in time prove
to be its downfall by revealing the failings of originalist philosophy.

* Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The
Author wishes to thank John Lillig for his excellent research assistance.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). For a fuller discussion on Heller, see infra notes 92–
143 and accompanying text.
2. The vote in Heller was 5–4. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2783.
3. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191 (2008).
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Originalism is based on the notion that the Constitution has a fixed
meaning that does not change with the passage of time.4 The proper role
of the Supreme Court, therefore, is to interpret the Constitution by
ascertaining its original meaning at the time it was first enacted.5 As this
view has it, the process of constitutional interpretation consists of a
search or quest for the original meaning of the document, which operates
as binding authority upon the judiciary. Consequently, the process of
constitutional interpretation should function as an objective inquiry that
precludes the exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court is
supposed to find meaning for the Constitution, not create it. According
to this way of thinking, Justices who depart from the straight and narrow
of originalism are engaged in an illegitimate pursuit, reading their
personal values into the Constitution, rather than adhering to its original
understanding.
There are two basic versions of originalism. The first or earlier
version stresses the intent of the Framers as an authoritative source by
which to ascertain original meaning. In fact, this version of originalism
looks almost exclusively to the Framers’ intent to determine constitutional
meaning.6 A second, somewhat later version of originalism seeks to
determine the original public understanding of the document. On this
account, the Framers’ intent may be useful in ascertaining the original
understanding of the Constitution, but only as part of a much broader
array of sources. What matters is not so much the intention of those who
drafted the document, but rather the understanding of the members of the
public who adopted it.7 The meaning of the Constitution, then, is
determined by the public understanding of the document at the time of
its adoption.

4. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 37–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849, 852–54, 862 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism].
5. Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 4, at 37–41.
6. For a brief time, some early originalists shifted to a focus on the intent of the
ratifiers of the document before dropping the focus on original intent, whether of the
Framers or the ratifiers, in favor of a focus on original public meaning. See Randy E.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). The
early version of originalism focusing on original intent “largely passed from the scene by
the early 1990s.” Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599, 603 (2004).
7. Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 4, at 38; Whittington, supra note 6, at 609–
11.
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There are various approaches to originalism. Under the extreme
approach, the only relevant factor in constitutional interpretation is the
original meaning of the document at the time it was enacted.8 According
to this approach, the meaning of the Constitution is constant and does
not change over time. Moreover, the Supreme Court is strictly bound to
follow the original meaning of the Constitution and may not take into
account other considerations.9 Justice Scalia is one of the more—if not
the most—prominent advocates of extreme originalism. He believes that
the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution strictly according to
its original understanding and not ascribe evolving meaning to it.10 As
he sees it, changes in the world around us are of no relevance to the
meaning of the document. Although Justice Scalia once claimed that in
a crunch he may prove to be a “faint-hearted originalist,” at the same
time he expressed strong opposition to the idea that the Constitution may
have evolutionary content, and he dismissed the notion that interpretation of
the document may change from age to age as nothing more than a
“canard.”11 Over the years, Justice Scalia has proven to be anything but
fainthearted in his commitment to originalism. To the contrary, he has
continued to insist that the Constitution be interpreted strictly according
to its original understanding. This was evident most recently in District
of Columbia v. Heller, when Justice Scalia maintained that although an
originalist view of the Second Amendment may be outmoded in presentday society, the Court was bound to follow the original understanding of
that Amendment.12
In contrast to the extreme view of originalism, a more moderate
approach looks to original meaning as a starting point but allows that the
meaning of constitutional provisions may be transformed as
circumstances change over time.13 Lawrence Lessig, for one, posits that

8. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086–87 (1989).
9. Id.
10. See Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 4, at 38; Scalia, Originalism, supra note
4, at 861–65.
11. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 4, at 853, 864.
12. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). For a more in-depth discussion on Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Heller, see infra notes 92–143 and accompanying text. See also
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003), in
which he argues that constitutional rights must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence” with changed circumstances.
13. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
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because meaning is a function of both text and context, the original
meaning of a constitutional provision may be “translated” to accommodate
contemporary circumstances.14 So, for example, the extension of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings in
1961 is viewed by Professor Lessig as a translation of the Fourth
Amendment justified by a “transformed social and legal context.”15
More recently, Jack Balkin has advocated an even more fluid version
of originalism that transmutes it into a kind of living constitutionalism
that allows each generation to make sense of the Constitution’s words
and principles in its own time.16 Professor Balkin maintains that proper
constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the words of the text as
understood in their original meaning and to the principles that underlie
the text, but does not require fidelity to the “original expected application”
of the text.17 According to this view, constitutional interpretation is a
never-ending process that produces change in constitutional doctrines,
practices, and law.18 Using this approach, Professor Balkin concludes
that the constitutional right to abortion is consistent with the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 This is a very moderate
species of originalism and, in fact, is the sort of jurisprudence that can be
happily embraced by those who believe in a living Constitution, the
meaning of which evolves over time so as to adapt to modern conditions.20
Nonetheless, there are those who maintain that even the moderate view
of originalism is unduly restrictive of constitutional interpretation
because it binds the present meaning of the Constitution to past
concepts, while not allowing for the recognition of new conceptions.21
While few, if any, originalists are as flexible as Professor Balkin,
some originalists recognize that the correct application of constitutional
meaning can change over time.22 Even so, their emphasis is on the
original understanding of the document, which strictly prescribes any
evolution of its meaning. Staunch originalists, however, take it as an
article of faith that the Constitution has a fixed meaning that does not
14. Id. at 1171 n.32.
15. Id. at 1232.
16. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007).
17. Id. at 295–96.
18. Id. at 295–303.
19. Id. at 310–51.
20. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611, 620–30 (1999).
21. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 411–12 (1997).
22. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or
Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 383–91 (2007).
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change with the passage of time. To a true believer, the original
meaning of the Constitution functions as an historical constant that may
only be changed by amending the Constitution itself.
It is important to note that originalism cannot explain the large body
of constitutional doctrine that has developed over the years since the
Constitution was adopted.23 Although in earlier times there may have
been a generally held belief that the Constitution had a fixed meaning
dictated by the intent of its Framers,24 this belief was little more than a
myth that obscured the true nature of constitutional adjudication.
Notwithstanding random statements of originalist import in various
cases over the years,25 the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Constitution have been nonoriginalist in their
methodology.26 In the words of Thomas Grey, it is “a matter of unarguable
historical fact” that over time the Court has developed a large body of
constitutional doctrine that does not derive from the original
understanding of the document.27 From its very inception, constitutional
law has been a dynamic process of creativity.28 Through the continual
interpretation and reinterpretation of the text, the Supreme Court perpetually
creates new meaning for the Constitution. Despite originalist myths to
the contrary, in reality the meaning of the Constitution has been anything
but constant.
As the twentieth century began, the Court increasingly abandoned
originalist pretenses in favor of a more realistic jurisprudence.29 By
1934, the Court had become openly dismissive of originalist theory,
observing in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell that the assertion

23. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION—ILLUSION AND
REALITY 3–10 (2001).
24. See Howard Gillman, Political Development and the Origins of the “Living
Constitution,” ADVANCE: J. AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2007, at 17, 18–19.
25. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of
the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of
its framers and the people who adopted it.” (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662,
670 (1889))).
26. See SHAMAN, supra note 23, at 3–10. Even Justice Scalia, a steadfast advocate
of originalism, admits that many of the Court’s decisions have been based on nonoriginalist
theories of constitutional interpretation. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 4, at 852.
27. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1978).
28. See SHAMAN, supra note 23, at 3–10.
29. See Gillman, supra note 24, at 21–23.
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that “the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their
time, would have placed upon them . . . carries its own refutation.”30
Similarly, twenty years later, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
rebuffed originalist claims regarding the Fourteenth Amendment,
explaining “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
was adopted.”31 By this time, the Court had become decidedly nonoriginalist
in word as well as deed, openly embracing the jurisprudence of a living
Constitution.32
The Court’s modern jurisprudence was not well received in all
corners. In the 1970s, some commentators began to question what they
saw as the more open-ended methodology of constitutional interpretation
practiced by the Warren Court and later the Burger Court.33 Critics of
the Court charged that its decisions expanding individual rights and
liberties amounted to illegitimate policymaking that had no basis in the
Constitution.34 As these critics viewed matters, the Justices on the Court
were reading their own personal values into the Constitution, rather than
interpreting the document, as it properly should be, by turning to the
intent of the Framers.
A number of scholars, though, were quick to rise to the defense of
nonoriginalist constitutional interpretation.35 Moreover, they subjected
the early version of originalism, which looked to the Framers’ intent to
ascertain original meaning, to devastating criticism, exposing a number
of serious flaws in the originalist position.36 As these debates over
30. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442–43.
31. 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
32. See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, stating that:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the
limits of fundamental rights. . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (citation omitted).
33. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court
of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986);
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1976).
34. See Whittington, supra note 6, at 599–603.
35. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987);
R ONALD D WORKIN , T AKING R IGHTS S ERIOUSLY (1977); M ICHAEL J. P ERRY , T HE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
36. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Grey, supra note 27; John E. Nowak, Realism,
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constitutional jurisprudence unfolded, the composition of the Supreme
Court was changing, and in time a new majority of justices on the Court
saw fit to put a halt on the expansion of individual rights. Under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court was increasingly
predisposed to curtail the recognition of new rights or liberties and even
to rescind some that were previously granted.37 No longer politically
necessary and seriously wounded by piercing criticism, the early version
of originalism “largely passed from the scene by the early 1990s.”38
In passing from the scene, however, the early version of originalism
was replaced by a new form of originalism, one that deemphasized the
intent of the Framers in favor of the original public’s understanding of
the Constitution as the source of its meaning.39 As noted above, Justice
Scalia is perhaps the most prominent advocate of the new originalism,
but several scholars have taken up its cause as well.40 Beyond that,
originalism has gained a widespread acceptance in the sense that almost
no one believes that the original understanding is completely irrelevant
to contemporary constitutional interpretation.41 That, however, is a far
cry from the extreme version of the new originalism espoused by Justice
Scalia and others asserting that the Constitution has a constant meaning
determined by its original understanding.
With the appointment of Justice Scalia and later Justice Thomas to the
Supreme Court, originalism has reappeared in that lofty venue. Both
Justices have proven to be pertinacious advocates of an extreme variety
of originalism that posits a fixed meaning of the Constitution as it was
first understood. The originalism espoused by Justices Scalia and
Thomas is a departure—and a radical one, at that—from the Supreme
Court’s well-established jurisprudence of a living Constitution. The
radical nature of the sort of originalism promoted by these two jurists is
most dramatically evident in those opinions of Justice Thomas
suggesting that a large area of law concerning the Commerce Clause be
Nihilism, and the Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing but Robes?, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 246 (1983).
37. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xvi (2008).
38. Whittington, supra note 6, at 603.
39. Id. at 608–12.
40. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 20; Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and
Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A
Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007).
41. See Farber, supra note 8, at 1086.
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overruled because it is based on nonoriginalist thinking.42 To overrule,
as Justice Thomas would have it, an extensive body of law that has
developed over many years would be a decidedly unsettling undertaking
that could have severe consequences for the legal system.43 And to do
so in pursuit of an originalist agenda would be an inordinate deviation
from the constitutional jurisprudence that has guided the Court since the
beginning of the twentieth century.
Despite the efforts of Justices Scalia and Thomas, originalism has not
been a significant theme on either the Rehnquist Court or the Roberts
Court.44 The advocacy of originalism by both Scalia and Thomas has
come almost exclusively in dissenting or concurring opinions that
garnered little support from other Justices.45 Indeed, it was not until the
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller46 in 2008 that Justice
Scalia was finally able to garner a majority of the Court—and only a 5–4
majority, at that—to sign onto an opinion emphatically taking an
originalist slant.47 Heller may represent the apogee of originalism and,
because it exposes the fundamental flaws of originalism, may mark the
beginning of its decline.48
Before discussing the more basic failings of originalism, it is
interesting to note that in a certain sense the theory of originalism is selfdefeating because in all probability the Constitution was not originally
understood to have a constant meaning fixed at the time of its
inception.49 According to H. Jefferson Powell, historical research shows
that the Framers did not expect their intentions to govern future
42. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–85, 601–02 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
In another area, Justice Thomas also has stated that he would be inclined to overrule a
group of cases upholding a right of equal access to the criminal justice system because
they are inconsistent with the Framers’ intent. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 138–39 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. “[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to
this point.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REV. 246, 249 (2008).
45. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring); M.L.B., 519 U.S.
at 129–44 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584–602 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
46. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
47. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 249.
48. See infra notes 92–143 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of
Heller.
49. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); see also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
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interpretation of the Constitution.50 Ironically, then, originalism seems
to be contrary to the original understanding of the Constitution.
There are, however, less ironic but more serious flaws to originalism,
especially in its more extreme form. At the most fundamental level,
originalism misperceives the nature of history by presuming that it has
an objective meaning that can be discovered if one is only diligent
enough to search through enough ancient material. Unfortunately, it is a
mistake to think that the original meaning of the Constitution is an
existential “thing” waiting to be unearthed from old records and
documents.51 As any good historian knows, interpretation of the past
entails considerably more than rummaging around in old archives to find
hidden materials. The astute historian Edward Hallett Carr explains that
“[t]he belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and
independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous
fallacy.”52 Despite clichés to the contrary, historical events do not speak
for themselves.53 History can easily be misread if one is not careful to
engage in thoughtful analysis of historical sources. Historical evidence
often cannot be taken at face value; rather, it must be interpreted in light
of its context, a complex, though necessary, exercise. Arthur Schlesinger
Jr., winner of the Pulitzer Prize for History, observed that “all historians
are prisoners of their own experience . . . [who] bring to history the
preconceptions of our personalities and of our age.”54 The historian, he
explains, “is committed to a doomed enterprise—the quest for an
unattainable objectivity.”55
The historian, therefore, is “necessarily selective” and the “element of
interpretation enters into every fact of history.”56 Historical analysis
entails creativity as well as discovery. “In truth the actual past is gone;
and the world of history is an intangible world, re-created imaginatively,
and present in our minds.”57 Even when done properly, historical
analysis leaves a good deal of room for the historian to make value
50. See Powell, supra note 49.
51. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477
(1981).
52. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 6 (1961).
53. Id. at 6–8.
54. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Folly’s Antidote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A19.
55. Id.
56. CARR, supra note 52, at 6–7.
57. Carl L. Becker, What Are Historical Facts?, 8 W. POL. Q. 327, 333 (1955)
(emphasis added).
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judgments. The historian sees things from a particular point of view,
according to a particular value system. Historical meaning may be
conceived at various levels of abstraction, ranging from the specific to
the general, which offer differing, yet equally valid (or equally invalid),
visions of the past.58 In essence, historical analysis is a selective
enterprise through which one imagines the past and thereby shapes it
according to his or her personal vision of reality.
True historians understand that the meaning of the Constitution does
not reside in the past, and that any attempt to ascertain the original
meaning of the Constitution necessarily entails reconstructing the past in
one’s mind.59 Originalism, therefore, cannot eliminate the necessity of
making value judgments to interpret the Constitution. Rather, it
obscures the policymaking function of constitutional interpretation by
pretending that the meaning of constitutional provisions can be
recovered from historical annals. Thus, there is an insidious aspect to
originalism in that it sneaks a judge’s personal views into constitutional
interpretation by pretending they are nothing more than the original
understanding of the document. Originalism offers an illusion of
objectivity by holding out the false hope that the meaning of the
Constitution exists somewhere in the past.
Originalism can be a risky enterprise for judges prone to selfdeception. In searching the historical record for original meaning, there
is often a temptation to discover what one wants to discover.60 A judge
may think that he or she is finding the original understanding of a
constitutional text, when in truth it is the judge’s own beliefs that are
being revealed. Earlier originalists, purportedly searching for the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution, were prone to this failing61 and laterday originalists have succumbed to the same temptation on a number of
occasions.62 It seems that some practitioners of originalism are inclined

58. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1067–87 (1990). Justice Scalia has asserted
that in ascertaining original meaning of the Constitution, the Court should refer to “the
most specific level” at which a right can be identified. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). This overlooks that choosing any
level of abstraction, whether specific or general, is in itself a value judgment. See id. at
138–40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, rights may be specific or general depending
on the perspective from which they are viewed; there is no way to determine the most
specific level of abstraction. See Tribe & Dorf, supra, at 1067–87.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 51–58.
60. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60 (1980).
61. Id.
62. See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Interpretation: Reclaiming the High
Road, ADVANCE: J. AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2007, at 89.
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to abandon their originalist principles when it suits their political
purposes to do so.63 Indeed, in a number of instances originalists can be
seen ignoring the historical record when it conflicts with their political
agenda.64
More principled originalists may endeavor to hew more faithfully to
the historical record. Even so, they are engaged in an impossible quest:
the attempt to find a predetermined meaning for the Constitution in the
recesses of history. In truth, the meaning of the Constitution is not fixed
in the past, or anywhere else, for that matter. When judges purport to
engage in originalist interpretation, they recreate the past according to
their own visions, including, it should be said, their own values. Originalist
interpretation of the Constitution may provide a veneer of objectivity,
but it is little more than a pretext that obscures the true nature of
constitutional interpretation, which necessarily involves the exercise of
judicial creativity.
While the open-endedness of history should not be enough to scare
away the Supreme Court from historical analysis of the Constitution, the
Court should understand that the meaning of the Constitution is not fixed
in history and waiting to be found. Indeed, as Erwin Chemerinsky
points out: “It is misguided and undesirable to search for a theory of
constitutional interpretation that will yield determinate results, right and
wrong answers, to most constitutional questions. No such theory exists or
ever will exist.”65
Even if one could somehow overcome the difficulties of reconstructing
the original understanding of the Constitution, it still might not be sound
to follow that path. There is, of course, the question, posed long ago by
Thomas Jefferson, of whether one generation has a right to bind
another. 66 To Jefferson, the answer was self-evident: “the earth

63. Id.
64. Id. at 91–92; see also Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1479, 1497 (2008) (pointing out that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000), “simply dismissed the Ninth Amendment as nonjusticiable without
any examination of the Amendment’s text or original meaning”).
65. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Interpretation for the Twenty-First Century,
ADVANCE: J. AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2007, at 25.
66. As phrased by Thomas Jefferson:
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems
never to have been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a
question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also,
among the fundamental principles of every government. The course of reflection
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belongs . . . to the living . . . [and] the dead have neither powers nor
rights over it.”67 Perhaps, though, the more telling concern is not so
much one of authority—not so much a question of whether the dictates
of a past generation should bind the present generation—as it is a
concern about transposition, that is, a question of whether past
understanding of the Constitution can be meaningfully transposed from
one generation to another. Whatever the original meaning of the
Constitution may once have been, it was formed in the context of a past
reality and in accordance with past attitudes, both of which have
changed considerably since the Constitution was drafted. History is
inherently evolutionary, and a true historical approach to interpreting the
Constitution would not come to an abrupt end with the adoption of the
Constitution in 1787. Rather, it would recognize the evolving nature of
history as an ongoing source of meaning for the Constitution. It is
simplistic and ahistorical to believe that the Constitution can be
interpreted simply by reference to the original understanding of the
document. To transfer that understanding, fashioned under past
conditions and attitudes, to contemporary situations may produce sorry
consequences that are contrary to the original understanding of the
Constitution. Blindly following the presumed meaning of constitutional
provisions formulated in reaction to past conditions and attitudes that
have long since changed does not, in the end, achieve the original
understanding. Nor is it very likely to be an effective means of dealing
with contemporary problems. Adherence to the original understanding
of the Constitution reduces the capacity of the document to be used to
respond to the needs of modern society. Originalism, or at least the
extreme version of originalism, is dysfunctional—an instance of cultural
lag whereby the meaning of the Constitution is left dormant while the
world around it changes.
Justice Brennan once observed that “the genius of the Constitution
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead
and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with

in which we are immersed here on the elementary principles of society has
presented this question to my mind; and that no such obligation can be so
transmitted I think very capable of proof.—I set out on this ground which I
suppose to be self evident, “that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living”:
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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current problems and current needs.”68 Therefore, he maintained, whatever
the Constitution may have meant in the past should not be the measure
of what it means today.69 As Woodrow Wilson once put it, “[t]he
Constitution was not meant to hold the government back to the time of
horses and wagons.”70
Some scholars take this line of reasoning one step further by
maintaining that the original understanding is inextricably locked to the
past and cannot be transplanted to the present.71 In other words, because
the original understanding was formed in reference to a reality and ways
of thinking that no longer exist, it cannot sensibly be applied to the
present. The original meaning of the Constitution is inextricably bound
to the past, and it is senseless to attempt to transpose it to the present or
future. What the people of 1787 may have intended for their times is not
what they may have intended for ours. Life constantly changes, and the
reality and ideas that existed in 1787 are long since gone.
Consider, for instance, the authority granted to Congress by Article I
of the Constitution to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”72 Originally this was meant to allow Congress to regulate no
more than interstate transactions, leaving it to each state to deal with
internal transactions that had no impact beyond its borders.73 In those
days, however, it was much simpler to draw a line between commerce
that was interstate and commerce that was internal to a state. There was
not much of a national economy, and many transactions were purely
intrastate. By the end of the nineteenth century, the situation was
radically different74 and is even more so today with the advent of
globalization. Now there is an immense national and international
economy that affects every locality. There is a vast network of commerce,

68. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
69. Id.
70. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
169 (1908), quoted in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 285 (1960).
71. See, e.g., John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in
Constitution Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 511–23 (1964).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
74. See Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One,
47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (1934); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
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connecting its various elements to one another. Even transactions that
occur entirely within one state’s borders have repercussions in other
states, not to mention other nations. These prodigious changes in our
economy render the original understanding of the Commerce Clause all
but irrelevant. The original understanding of “Commerce among the
several States” was formulated when economic conditions were drastically
different and makes little, if any, sense in reference to the contemporary
era of a global economy.
Despite the vast changes that have transformed the nation’s economy,
Justice Thomas has suggested that the Supreme Court should abandon
much of the existing constitutional doctrine concerning the Commerce
Clause that has developed since the 1930s and in its place return to
doctrine more consistent with the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause.75 This suggestion would render the Commerce Clause desultory,
an eighteenth-century proviso adrift in a twenty-first-century world.
Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark decision in 1954 ruling
that racial segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, offers another telling example of why, as the world around
us changes, original meaning of a constitutional provision cannot be
transplanted from one time to another.76 As the Supreme Court explained
in Brown, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, public
education was in a nascent stage.77 In the South, there were relatively
few public schools, and what schooling was available, for white students
only, was conducted by private groups.78 In some Southern States,
education of African-Americans was prohibited by law, and throughout
the South, few African-Americans received any education whatsoever.79
In the North, while public schools were more prevalent, they were a far
cry from what they would later become.80 The curriculum was rudimentary,
ungraded schools were common in rural areas, the school term was three
months a year in many states, and “compulsory school attendance was
virtually unknown.”81
By 1954, of course, the situation was very different. As the Court
pointed out in Brown, by the mid-twentieth century, education was
75. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–85, 601–02 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
76. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. Id. at 489–90.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 490.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.82
That compulsory school attendance laws had been adopted throughout
the nation and vast sums of public money allocated to public schools
demonstrated the nation’s commitment to the importance of education in
a democratic society.83 Education was recognized as the “foundation of
good citizenship,” essential to the performance of basic public
responsibilities.84 Moreover, education was vital to foster socialization,
to convey cultural values, and to prepare for later professional training.85
A high school diploma, not to mention a college degree, was a requisite
of entry to the job market, and more education led to higher paying,
more fulfilling employment. In sum, it was doubtful that any child
could be expected to succeed in life if he or she was denied the
opportunity of an education.86
Given these momentous changes concerning education, the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not speak to the
constitutional issue presented to the Court in Brown in 1954. As the
Court itself said: “[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.”87
Brown vividly illustrates that history cannot always resolve the
problems of today, and in fact, too literal a quest for past intentions may
be counterproductive.88 Whatever meaning the Constitution originally
possessed is rooted in the past and cannot be readily transplanted to the
present. Extreme originalism ignores that times change and that the
validity of past beliefs may diminish. At its worst, originalism renders
the Constitution “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.”89 Even in less dire

82. Id. at 493.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 492–93.
88. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
89. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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renditions, originalism leaves the Constitution a passive thing, unresponsive
to the reality in which it exists.
That is not to say that the past should be ignored; certainly there are
valuable lessons to be learned from history. It is to say, however, that
the original understanding of the Constitution should not be accepted as
an infallible source that dictates the present-day meaning of the document.
We should attempt to comprehend past constitutional history, insofar as we
can, but should not allow it to rule us. As Chief Justice Warren said on
the occasion of his retirement from the Supreme Court: “We, of course,
venerate the past, but our focus is on the problems of the day and the
future as far as we can foresee it.”90
The Framers themselves seemed to be aware that they could not
predict the future and therefore took the sensible course of formulating
the Constitution in a way that would allow it to be adapted to changing
conditions as time passed.91 Unfortunately, those who rigidly cling to
the myopic myth of originalism often ignore the sensibility of that
course of action.
II. ORIGINALISM IN EXTREMIS: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller,
marking the first time that a majority of the Court—albeit a slim 5–4
majority—signed onto an opinion so decidedly originalist in its
approach.92 The opinion in Heller, written by Justice Scalia, may be
considered the triumph of originalism but in time may prove to be its
downfall, revealing, as it does, the deep fault lines that run through
originalist theory.
In Heller, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment of the
Constitution protects an individual right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia and to use that firearm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Accordingly, the Court went on to strike down a D.C. law that banned
the possession of handguns.93 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority
in Heller adheres faithfully to his rigid originalist philosophy. Much of

90. Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Retirement Address (June 23, 1969), in 395
U.S. VII, X (1969).
91. See Powell, supra note 49; Sherry, supra note 49.
92. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 249.
93. The law also required that lawfully owned firearms be kept “unloaded and
dissembled or bound by a trigger lock . . . unless they [were] located in a placed of
business or [were] being used for lawful recreational activities.” District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the opinion is devoted to an historical exposition of the Second
Amendment, which was enacted in 1791, to show that it originally
secured an individual right to possess firearms unconnected with service
in a militia and that it proscribed laws that prohibit the possession of
firearms commonly used for lawful purposes. The opinion surveys
seventeenth-century English history, eighteenth-century American
dictionaries, Blackstone’s Commentaries, the Journals of the Continental
Congress, The Federalist Papers, The Anti-Federalist Papers, early
American political essays and treatises, state constitutional enactments
adopted both before and shortly after the Second Amendment, and other
sources from around the time of the American Revolution.94 The
opinion is thoroughly originalist; it looks exclusively to the original
understanding of the Second Amendment and allows for no evolution of
the Amendment’s meaning. Changed circumstances have absolutely no
bearing on Justice Scalia’s analysis of the Second Amendment, and
practical considerations are dismissed out of hand. All that matters to
Justice Scalia is the original meaning of the Second Amendment at the
time it was adopted in 1791.
After surveying the historical materials, Justice Scalia concluded that
while the purpose of “codifying” the right to bear arms as a
constitutional provision was to ensure the preservation of a wellregulated militia, this did not suggest that preserving the militia was the
only reason for which Americans valued the right to bear arms; “most
undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and
hunting.”95 As Justice Scalia read history, it was individual self-defense
that was the “central component” of the Second Amendment right to
bear arms.96 Although admitting that the right to bear arms was not
unlimited, Justice Scalia again turned to history, at this point to
determine the permissible limits that may be placed on the right to bear
arms.97 He explicitly rejected use of a test that would balance the
competing interests in the case and flatly refused to consider any
empirical evidence that showed the need to regulate handgun violence.98
94. Id. at 2790–808.
95. Id. at 2801.
96. Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 2797 (“Putting all of these textual
elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.”).
97. Id. at 2816–17.
98. Id. at 2821.
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The Second Amendment, Scalia proclaimed, “elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.”99 That relevant circumstances concerning
the Second Amendment may have changed over the years was of no
moment to Scalia. He acknowledged the problem of handgun violence
in the nation but deemed it irrelevant because “the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table.”100 He allowed that an originalist view of the Second Amendment
may be outmoded in present-day society where a standing army is well
supplied with arms, where well-trained police forces provide personal
security, and where gun violence is an extremely serious problem, but
dismissed those considerations because “it is not the role of [the
Supreme] Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”101
It is interesting to compare Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller to the
dissenting opinion that Justice Stevens entered. Like Justice Scalia,
Justice Stevens engaged in an extensive examination of the historical
record concerning the Second Amendment. He surveyed the debates at
the Constitutional Convention, proposals from a number of state
ratifying conventions, the English Bill of Rights, Blackstone’s
Commentaries, post-enactment commentary, nineteenth-century case
law, and more. After assessing this material, Justice Stevens concluded,
in contradistinction to Justice Scalia, that the Second Amendment
protects the individual right to bear arms only in connection with
military service and does not limit the authority of the government to
regulate the nonmilitary use or possession of firearms. As Justice
Stevens saw it, the preamble to the Second Amendment clearly states
that the purpose of the Amendment is to protect the right of the people of
each of the several states to maintain a well-regulated militia. Moreover,
Stevens believes that the historical record emphatically confirms that
“the Framers’ single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional
guarantee ‘to keep and bear arms’ was on military uses of firearms,
which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.”102
Justice Breyer entered a separate dissenting opinion asserting that
whatever the original meaning of the Second Amendment may have
been, it should mark the beginning of the constitutional inquiry, rather
than its end.103 In Justice Breyer’s view, the constitutional issues raised
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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by the case could only be resolved by focusing upon practicalities—the
purpose of the D.C. law in question, the problems that called it into
being, and its relationship to its objectives.104 Applying a balancing test
that took into account extensive empirical evidence showing the
magnitude of gun-related crime and violence, Justice Breyer concluded
that the D.C. law, directed to the presence of handguns in high crime
urban areas, was a constitutionally permissible legislative response to a
serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.105
It should come as no surprise that both Justice Scalia and Stevens can
undertake what appears to be a scholarly exegesis of the original
understanding of the Second Amendment yet come to opposite
conclusions as to what the Amendment means. As we have seen, the
meaning of the Constitution does not reside in history, and when judges
engage in originalist interpretation, they recreate the past according to
their own visions, including, of course, their own values. While both the
Scalia and Stevens opinions in Heller are replete with historical detail,
neither exhibits “the subtlety, nuance, acknowledgement of
counterarguments, and (above all) immersion in Founding-era debates”
that is essential to good historical research.106 To the contrary, both
opinions traffic in “the worst kind of ‘law-office history,’ in which each
side engages in shamelessly (and shamefully) selective readings of the
historical record in order to support what one strongly suspects are predetermined positions.”107 For all his professed love of history, Justice
Scalia seems to be unaware of the complexities of historical research,
and both he and Justice Stevens seem to be ignorant of the principle,
“second nature to professional historians, that the historical record is
complicated and, indeed, often contradictory.”108 In their zeal to persuade,
“both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens assert—laughably to a real
historian—that the Second Amendment had only one meaning at the
framing, and that that meaning was for all practical purposes universally
shared.”109 Good historians know that matters are much more complex

104. Id.
105. Id. at 2854–66.
106. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 257.
107. Posting of Sandy Levinson to Balkin.blogspot, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/
some-preliminary-reflections-on-heller.html (June 26, 2008).
108. Id.
109. Posting of Mark Tushnet to Balkin.blogspot, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/
more-on-heller.html (June 27, 2008).
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than this, and that the Second Amendment did not have a single meaning
universally shared throughout the nation when it was enacted in 1791.110
Good historians also know that history is inherently evolutionary and
the world around us changes. Whatever may have been the original
understanding of the Second Amendment, that understanding was
formulated over 200 years ago in a very different world where gun
violence was not nearly as prevalent as it is today and where police
forces provided minimal protection against crime and violence. As
Judge Richard Posner recently pointed out, “[t]here are few more
antiquated constitutional provisions than the Second Amendment.”111
Yet Justice Scalia is willing to cling to what he believes to be the
original meaning of this antiquated provision, brushing aside the serious
problem of gun-related crime in present-day society.
That relevant circumstances concerning the Second Amendment may
have changed over the years is of no moment to Scalia. He
acknowledges the problem of handgun violence in the nation but deems
it irrelevant because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”112 He allows that
an originalist view of the Second Amendment may be outmoded in
present-day society where a standing army is well supplied with arms,
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where
gun violence is an extremely serious problem, but dismisses those
considerations because “it is not the role of [the] Court to pronounce the
Second Amendment extinct.”113 All of this, of course, begs the question
by assuming that the Second Amendment must be interpreted according
to its original meaning. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting
opinion, the constitutional right that the Court announced in its opinion
“was not ‘enshrined’ in the Second Amendment by the Framers”; rather,
it was set forth by the Court itself in a groundbreaking decision investing
the Second Amendment with meaning that was not previously
realized.114
Justice Scalia’s refusal in Heller to consider present-day concerns was
particularly troubling to Justice Breyer. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Breyer pointed out that Justice Scalia’s originalist approach
ignores an important question:

110. Id.
111. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27,
2008, http://www.tnr.com/article/books/defense-looseness#.
112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Given the purposes for which the Framers enacted the Second Amendment, how
should it be applied to modern-day circumstances that they could not
have anticipated? Assume, for argument’s sake, that the Framers did intend
the Amendment to offer a degree of self-defense protection. Does that mean
that the Framers also intended to guarantee a right to possess a loaded gun near
swimming pools, parks, and playgrounds? That they would not have cared
about the children who might pick up a loaded gun on their parents’ bedside
table? That they . . . would have lacked concern for the risk of accidental deaths or
suicides that readily accessible loaded handguns in urban areas might bring?115

These questions cannot be answered, Justice Breyer pointedly noted,
simply by “combining inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse
dixit.”116 Indeed, whatever may be revealed by historical research
concerning the Second Amendment cannot answer the questions of
today about how the Amendment should be interpreted and applied in
light of current reality.
After concluding that the Second Amendment does protect an
individual right to possess firearms unconnected with service in a
militia, Justice Scalia allowed that the right secured by the Second
Amendment, like most rights, was not unlimited.117 From Blackstone
through nineteenth-century cases, he noted, both courts and commentators
explained that the right was “not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”118 To
determine what limits may be placed on the right to bear arms, Justice
Scalia again turned to history, noting with approval that the Court had
previously ruled in United States v. Miller that the Second Amendment
protected possession of the sort of weapons that were “in common use at
the time.”119 That limitation, Justice Scalia declared, “is fairly supported
by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and
unusual weapons.’”120 Thus, the Scalia opinion recognizes a qualification
to the right to keep and carry arms, which limits the right to the
possession of commonly used weapons that are not especially dangerous
or unusual.
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in this instance is reminiscent of the
reasoning in Lochner v. New York, which took a similar formalistic

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2816 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
Id. (citations omitted).
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approach based on what the Court believed to be common knowledge in
order to limit the authority of a state to regulate working conditions.121
In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law setting maximum
hours of work for bakers on the ground that it violated the constitutional
right to liberty of contract protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the State’s assertion that the law
was a permissible health measure designed to protect the well-being of
bakers, the Court declared that it was commonly understood that the
trade of a baker has never been viewed as an unhealthy one.122 In both
Lochner and Heller, the Court erects categories to delineate the scope of
a constitutional right and the authority of the state to enact laws that
limit the right. In Lochner the category was based on common
understanding, while in Heller it is based on common usage. In either
case, the Court sets forth formal categories that function to define the
meaning of the Constitution.
The problem in Lochner was that in relying on its view of common
knowledge, the Court ignored the reality of the situation. Whatever
might have been the common understanding of the nature of the baking
trade, empirical evidence had been presented to the Court, and cited in
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion,123 showing that the occupation of
baking did in fact pose significant health risks. In other words, the Court
in Lochner ignored that there was a compelling reason to support the
New York maximum hour law.
Along the same lines, the problem in Heller is that the Court, in
relying on common practice at the time the Second Amendment was
adopted, ignores the reality of the present situation. Whatever may have
been the common practice concerning firearms in the eighteenth century,
empirical evidence demonstrates a present-day need for gun control
measures, such as the one adopted by the District of Columbia. In other
words, the Court in Heller ignores that there is a compelling state
interest to support the D.C. law banning handguns.
In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion acknowledges the serious problem of
handgun violence in the nation but asserts that the Second Amendment
“necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table,” thus precluding
laws that prohibit possession of handguns that may be used for selfdefense in the home.124 As Justice Scalia sees it, the Second Amendment
precludes balancing because it “elevates above all other interests the
121.
122.
123.
124.
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right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.”125 Hence, the opinion flatly refuses to take a balancing
approach to determine the permissible limitations that may be placed on
the right to bear arms.126 Justice Scalia explicitly rejects the possibility
of balancing and is sharply critical of its use.
Regarding balancing, Justice Scalia states that he “know[s] of no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”127 He insists
that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”128
Hence, the Court “would not apply an ‘interest-balancing’ approach to
the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie.”129
This simply is incorrect. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court
has continuously shaped and reshaped the scope of constitutional rights,
including enumerated constitutional rights, and for many years has done
so primarily through a process of balancing interests.130 Notwithstanding
Justice Scalia’s assertion to the contrary, the free speech provision of the
First Amendment stands as a prominent example of the Court’s use of
balancing to define the scope of an enumerated constitutional right.
Balancing became an important part of First Amendment jurisprudence
at a relatively early date. Justice Holmes’s clear and present danger test,
first enunciated during World War I, is a form of balancing that weighs
the need to restrict speech.131 Later, the Court adopted a refined version
of the clear and present danger test as part of the balancing calculus to
determine when it is constitutionally permissible to regulate speech that
may incite unlawful conduct.132 In 1939, in striking down an ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the ground that it violated
the First Amendment, the Court explained that “the delicate and difficult
task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the

125. Id. at 2821.
126. Id. at 2821–22.
127. Id. at 2821.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See SHAMAN, supra note 23, at 1–26.
131. The clear and present danger test was first used in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
132. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
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substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.”133
As a general matter, content-based regulations of speech are subject to a
strict scrutiny balancing test that asks whether they are narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. Content-neutral regulations of
speech are subject to an intermediate scrutiny balancing test that asks
whether they are appropriately related to an important governmental
interest. Although some First Amendment rules do not involve
balancing, many of them do, and balancing plays a significant role in
a great many First Amendment cases.
His opinion in Heller does not represent Justice Scalia’s first attack on
the balancing process. In a concurring opinion in Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enterprises decided in 1988, he argued that balancing
should not be used to decide dormant Commerce Clause cases because
“the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both
sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular
line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”134
This is clever, but disingenuous. It misconceives the nature of
balancing by casting it as a quantitative measure rather than a qualitative
one. The balance or scale certainly is an appropriate analogy—or more
precisely, an appropriate metaphor—that refers to the comparative
assessment of individual and governmental interests. Justice Scalia
should be well aware that the term “balancing” is not to be taken literally
in the sense that interests are quantitatively weighed or measured against
one another. Rather, balancing entails a qualitative weighing of interests
to “appraise the substantiality of the reasons” relevant to the
constitutionality of a law.135 Balancing is a process that the Supreme
Court has used for many years in many cases, including cases involving
enumerated constitutional rights.
Justice Scalia’s more serious objection to balancing is that it involves
the making of value judgments, a task that Justice Scalia believes is
beyond the competence of the courts and that should be left to the
legislature. This criticism, though, seriously misperceives the true
nature of the constitutional process. The truth is that constitutional
interpretation, whether done through the process of balancing, the mode
of originalism, or any other methodology, necessarily involves making
value choices.136 Despite persistent myth to the contrary, the fact is that
133. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
134. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
136. See SHAMAN, supra note 23, at 44–46.
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constitutional interpretation is impossible without some choosing among
values or policies. Judging, after all, is precisely that: making judgments
or choosing among values.137
As explained previously, originalism does not obviate the necessity of
making value judgments to interpret the Constitution.138 Instead, it
masks the policymaking function of constitutional interpretation by
pretending that the meaning of the Constitution is dictated by its original
understanding. Although originalism may present itself as value-neutral,
in truth it is nothing of the sort; with originalism, value judgments are
made covertly through the illusion of original meaning.
In contrast, balancing affords transparency and rationality to
constitutional adjudication. Balancing is a realistic means of constitutional
interpretation that acknowledges that constitutional decisionmaking
necessarily entails the making of value judgments. Balancing brings
those value judgments out into the open and directs that they be made in
a considered, thoughtful way. The great value of balancing is that it brings
purposefulness to the process of constitutional interpretation. Balancing
is teleological; it calls for informed decisionmaking done in a purposive
manner. While originalism obscures the policy questions generated by
constitutional adjudication, balancing attempts to answer them through
the exercise of reasoned judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller is the sort of discourse that gives
originalism an especially bad name. It takes a decidedly lopsided view
of the historical record to advance a constitutional right that had never
been recognized before. Given the serious flaws of his opinion, it was

137. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,”
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988), for a discussion on Justice Cardozo’s view of a judge’s
role:
Having admitted and demonstrated that judges inevitably confront value
choices, Cardozo did not shrink from the implications of that admission. He
rejected the prevailing myth that a judge’s personal values were irrelevant to
their decision process . . . .
. . . He attacked the myth that judges were oracles of pure reason, and
insisted that we consider the role that human experience, emotion, and passion
play in the judicial process.
Id. at 4–5.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 51–65.
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inevitable that Justice Scalia would be accused of abandoning principled
analysis in favor of pursuing a political agenda. Indeed, critics on both
sides of the ideological spectrum have accused Justice Scalia of exactly
that. Critics on the left, pointing to Scalia’s skewed historical lucubration,
were quick to assert that the opinion was driven by a partisan agenda
opposed to gun control.139 Perhaps more telling, however, was that
similar criticism came from a decidedly more conservative source,
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In an article published in the Virginia
Law Review, Judge Wilkinson likened the Heller decision to Roe v.
Wade.140 He asserted that both decisions show an absence of respect for
constitutional textualism and the tenets of federalism, both represent a
rejection of neutral principles, and both fail to show sufficient respect for
legislative judgments.141 As for the originalist analysis practiced by
Justice Scalia in Heller, Judge Wilkinson said this: “While Heller can be
hailed as a triumph of originalism, it can just as easily be seen as the
opposite—an exposé of original intent as a theory no less subject to
judicial subjectivity and endless argumentation as any other.”142 In Judge
Wilkinson’s view, the Scalia opinion in Heller amounts to an “aggressive
brand of originalism” that “discard[s] the tenets of [judicial] restraint.”143
Heller is indeed an aggressive brand of originalism, and one that
exhibits the worst faults of that methodology. At its foundation, Heller
succumbs to the illusion that the original meaning of the Second
Amendment has an independent and objective existence that can
somehow be magically recovered through diligent study of the past. In
falling prey to this illusion, Heller perpetrates a pretense of objectivity
that functions as a facade for policymaking. Moreover, Heller ignores
that whatever meaning the Second Amendment may have had when it
was adopted in 1791 cannot simply be transposed to the present. The
refusal in Heller to consider that the world around us has changed
renders the Second Amendment a senseless constitutional provision—an
antiquated law adrift in a contemporary world. Heller reveals the
fundamental failure of originalism; based on an illusion and dismissive
of reality, originalism cannot sustain a viable constitutional jurisprudence.

139. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 236–45; Levinson, supra note 107.
140. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009).
141. Id. at 254.
142. Id. at 256.
143. Id.
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